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DEBATES: HOW THEY ARE JUDGED 
A SYMPOSIUM 
And· so the judge, after carefully weighing all the 
issues' involved, made his decision •• .' ••••• 
And so the judge, after listening to the speakers who 
impressed him the most, made his decision •••••••• 
And so the judge, after remembering how many times the 
· coach of the teams involved in the debate he was hearing 
had voted against his teams, made his decision •••••••• 
And so the judge, after flipping a coin, made his 
decision •••• 
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How are debates judged? Are there significant dif-
ferences, or is there a common agreement concerning decision-
making? The Journal has solicited and received position 
papers from several debate coaches in the state of Tennessee 
answering the question: How do you arrive at your decision 
in a debate round as a judge? The following pages present 
their responses. We welcome any reaction papers any readers 
may have to these articles, including ones from debaters who 
may have wondered from time to time how they were judged. 
Randy Fisher 
With panels of three or five judges in the elimination 
rounds of most debate tournaments, "split" decisions are far 
from uncommon; this phenomenon does not necessarily represent 
differences in judging "philosophy." It may more likely 
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only suggest differences in what was heard, or how arguments 
were interpreted or weighted. In fact, since I know but one 
way to judge a debate, I assume everybody else judges the 
same way. (I offer that statement without any irony or 
satire intended.) Some judges frown more or less over the 
carless documentation of sources of evidence; some of us 
squirm more in response to shrill screams uttered in re-
buttal at 2-35 words per minute; some of us rate debaters 
from 0 to 30 while others may have narrowed those margins; 
some judges (like myself) seldom -ask to examine evidence 
after the debate is over because we believe debaters should 
clarify and apply data .in the debate if it is to be given 
credenc~; ~nd, there are even some judges (like myself) 
egocentric enough to believe we can keep an accurate record 
of all necessary and important bases for decision in a debate 
without a full stenographic account of every word .uttered. 
These are differences and many other similar one.s can be 
found but I honestly doubt that they are more than mechanistic 
differences between judges and do not provide. _for significant 
diffe.rences in how judgment is rendered. 
As new jargon is found for argumentative techniques, new 
questions are asked about methods of judging, but, again, I 
doubt that important differences really exis·t. :For example: 
Is debate a comparison of policy options or a test of hypotheses? 
(As I perceive it, it would not affect the basis for judgment.) 
Can a negative team win without any disadvantage offered or 
standing? (Of course, if at the end of the debate it has 
shown no need exists for change or if it has demonstrated 
that the affirmative plan won't really lead to beneficial 
results as claimed.) Is falsifying evidence sufficient 
reason for either team to lose? (Of course.) Can the 
negative win if it demonstrates that the affirmative plan 
of implementing the proposition lies outside the framework. 
of the resolution? (Of course. And I have never heard any 
judge of debate ever say otherwise.) Do you give weight to 
turnarounds? Or to upsidedowns? Or to Mickey Mouse? (Who 
cares--we judge the debate as a whole and sometimes these 
things add weight to affirmative or negative claims and 
some times they do not.) 
In competitive debate the affirmative team advocates 
change. To win it must demonstrate a need (significant 
reason) for that change (the elimination of damage or 
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severe threats of damage to important consensus values like 
freedom or justice or to more concrete matters like life, 
health, economic status); the affirmative must prove that the 
proposed change will work (it can be implemented, enforced, 
and will do what is claimed for it); and, finally, the affir-
mative must show that the benefits of change are not outweigh-
ed by offsetting ill effects greater than benefits gained. 
Judgment of debate proceeds through a series of paired com-
parisons in which the affirmative team argues that its 
evidence is valid and sufficient and applicable and in which 
the negative team contends that the evidence is inapplicable 
or invalid or insufficient or outweighed by other data. After 
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each initial line of argument has been explored and tested 
through a series of extensions, a decision is rendered. If 
satisfactory reason for change still exists, its workability 
claims have withstood attack and if disadvantages are out-
weighed or have been refuted--the affirmative wins. 
Judges may differ in opinions on which arguments 
withstood attack but I honestly doubt they have differences 
in judging "philosophy." _ Good judgment demands expertise, 
careful methods of receiving and assimilating, the ability 
to put aside pre-judgments et cetera--but its basis really 
offers no mystery. I apologize if I'm ignorant or naive. 
Richard Dean 
True to its argumentative tradition, the forensics com-
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munity has been characterized by controversy since Protagoras 
of Abdera decided that every question has at least two sides. 
Modern "debates about debating" have been concerned with two 
major questions: who should judge debates and by what 
criteria should debates be judged? This brief article is 
concerned with the latter, but some of the major controversies 
arising from the "who of debate judging should be noted. Such 
disputes have centered around these questions: should the 
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judge be a layman acting as a juror; an expert in the subject 
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of the debate; an experienced debate coach or should students 
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judge each other through peer evaluation? Each school has 
its proponents, but the use of the professional debate coach 
is the system presently most in vogue. As the venerable 
American Forens.ic Association states, "Contests should be 
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judged only by persons competent in speech evaluation." 
Quintilian described the ideal speaker as "a good man 
speaking well." Perhaps the ideal debate judge could be 
described as "a wise man judging with something akin to 
divine infallibility"--i.e., speaking ex cathedra with the 
collective wisdom of Aristotle, St. Thomas, Perelman, Stephen 
Toulmin, et al. Since such paragons of logical decision-
making are usually in short supply, the tournament director 
must use what he can get. But judging from student feedback, 
the use of debate coaches as critic/judges is reasonably 
satisfactory--especially when said students have won! 
And now to the second area of greatest controversy in 
debate judging. Exactly how should a judge determine his 
decision? Here again, polemics abound. One of the oldest 
arguments on this subject, and one that still continues in 
some quarters, concerns the "skills" vs. "issues" question. 
Two early coa~hes, James M. O'Neill and Hugh N. Wells engaged 
in a two year battle in the pages of the Quarterly Journal 
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of Speech over this problem. O'Neill argued that the debaters 
should be judged on the basis of the forensic skills they dis-
played, i.e., delivery, organization, refutation, etc. Wells 
maintained that skills could not be separated from the arguments 
themselves; he contended that it was debating skill that gave 
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force to argument. Today the "issues" approach is the preferr-
ed method of judging. However, it may be logically argued that 
the "skills vs. issues" controversy is actually in the same 
category with the "chicken vs. egg" argument, or the "immovable 
object vs. the irresistible force" controversy. We cannot have 
one without the other in meaningful discourse. Therefore, we 
cannot consider one in an oral contest without considering the 
other. The whole controversy is reminiscent of the "faith vs. 
works" dispute in the early Christian church. The apostle 
James wrote, "Faith without works is dead •.• I will show you 
my faith by my works." Thus, to use a scriptural praphrase, the 
debater shows us his skills by his arguments and lends force to 
his arguments by his skills. And these skills are generally con-
sidered · to be those listed on the Form "C" Ballot of the American 
Forensic Association, namely: analysis, reasoning, evidence, 
organization, refutation and delivery. Each should be carefully 
evaluated by the judge in relationship to its use by the debaters 
in presenting the issues of the debate. 
When c9nsidering the issues of the debate, the judge must 
include two types: stock issues that are common to every debate, 
and the issues arising from the specific contest at hand. 
Michael Sproule lists the former as follows: 
1. Is there a need for a change? 2. Can the plan 
meet the need? 3. Are there disadvantages to the 
plan? 4. Is the need significant and inherent in 
the present system? 5. Is the plan practical and 
workable? 6. Do the case and plan implement the 
resolution or are they outside the sphere of the 
resolution?? 
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The second type of issues inheres in the debate itself. 
For example, if the affirmative contends that the plan advocated 
will be superior to the status quo as in providing medical 
care for all citizens, this contention becomes an issue in 
the debate. The negative will be judged on its attack of the 
issue and the affirmative on its defense. As Sproule states, 
The duty of the affirmative is to justify 
change via a prima facie case. This ·requires 
the affirmative to undertake a burden of proof 
to demonstrate that their case and plan are 
viable in terms of the stock issues. The 
negative's duty to uphold presumption and re-
fute the affirmative requires them to be mindful 
of the stock and particular issues in the 
debate. . . the issues approach accords well with 
common sense. Why would anyone adopt a proposal 
that was unnecessary, failed to solve the problem 
or created worse problems than it solved.a 
Finally, the critic/judge of a debate should be willing 
to state his reasons for the decision he renders, either 
orally or in a written critique. As Austin Freeley writes, 
"Judges of educational debates have two functions: One, they 
must discern which team did the better debating; two, they 
must report their decisions in an educationally useful manner." 
Nicholas Cripe puts it this way, 
Because of the contest aspect of the debate, 
there is a tendency to place considerable emphasis 
on the decision. Actually who won should be of 
momentary importance to the teams and of even less 
importance to the judge. The truly important point 
is why one side won. The competent judge should 
clearly understand the reasons for his decision, 
and should be able to explain them with equal 
clarity ••• He should be constantlt striving to 
make himself a better critic judge. 0 
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Over half a century ago, Lew Sarett, poet, professor 
and debate authority par excellence wrote, "Who of us has 
not suffered, or imagined that he suffered from the dec-
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isions of incompetent, in-expert judges?" We have not 
reached utopia today in the debate community, but if the 
advice of the writers quoted in this article is heeded, we 
will surely be on our way towards better decisions. We 
may never arrive at instant omniscience, but we can at 
least hope for reasonable verdicts. 
Helen White 
Judging a debate requires three things: objectivity, 
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knowledge Qf debating principles and the topic, and the 
ability and willingness to follow the debate closely. These 
are the standards I try to apply in my judging assignments. 
First, I look at the case itself. Major issues must be 
defined and pertinent to the topic. The type of case, whether 
prima facie or comparative advantage, should be evident. The 
contentions must be valid, clearly stated, and supported by 
current and scholarly evidence, as opposed to a spattering of 
quotes from Time and US News & World Report. The affirmative 
debaters should be very familiar with the case and should not 
be trying to deal with one that has been researched and pre-
pared by someone else. (I have judged rounds in which the 
first affirmative speaker could not even pronounce fairly 
simple words or names contained within his prepared speech.) 
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In regard to the negative team and its responsibilities 
pertaining to the case, I expect it to point out the weak-
nesses and to focus on the substantative issues, rather than 
trivial points. If the negative team cannot detect the flaws 
in the affirmative presentation, then I do not penalize the 
affirmative side for them. 
Next, I pay close heed to the reasoning and logic 
evidenced by the teams. Premises and the conclusions drawn 
from them must be logical, pertinent, and adequate. One 
isolated incident does not "prove" a contention. Also, I 
determine if the analysis is being related to specific 
points; often, the debater is just rambling. "Canned shot-
gun" rebuttals are an abomination, as are labels such as 
"topicality" or "inherency" if the debater cannot relate 
specifics to this arguments. 
Closely related to reasoning is the use of supporting 
evidence. Here I look for relevancy, objectivity, and sub-
stance. The practice of fabricating or removing from context 
"helpful" evidence is perhaps the darkest cloud in academic 
debate. A judge has a responsibility to ferret our this 
practice and to penalize by forfeit the offenders. 
A well-organized presentation is one of my favorite 
things, for it makes following the debate so much easier. 
All my attention can be directed to what is being said. 
For the first affirmative speaker, organization is usually 
no problem; however, if the negative speakers can follow 
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the established organizational pattern, then their arguments 
are more effective and more to the point. I dislike having 
to keep a flow chart that resembles a temperature chart of 
a patient severely afflicted with a case of the chills and 
fever. 
The delivery and style of the debaters do not weigh 
nearly as heavily with me as the factors already discussed. 
Nevertheless, I do have some pet peeves in this regard. I 
dislike for debaters to tell me how to flow an argument 
across or how to award the decision. Smart aleck debaters 
with condescending attitudes toward weaker teams affect me 
negatively. Rudeness, whether it be in the form of loud 
"whispering," smirks, or affecting boredom, is something I 
find difficult to tolerate and is a factor in my decision if 
the debate is close. Those debaters who fight hard but fairly, 
and who know and accept the fact that a judge may not always 
choose as they would have liked are really fun to judge. 
In the final analysis, however, my decision rests on the 
content of the debate rather than the personalities of the 
debaters. The majority of these students work too hard to 
have their efforts nullified by biased, ignorant, irresponsible 
judges. Moreover, the future of academic debate depends upon 
competent, knowledgable, and objective coaches and judges. 
Jim Hqlm 
Traditionally, there have been two competing methods of 
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judging debates. The first method is to decide who won the 
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debate on the basis of who won the key issues; the second, to 
decide on the basis of who did the better job of debating. I 
prefer the second method because I believe it produces more 
equitable decisions. In the next few paragraphs, I shall try 
to illustrate this point with some examples from a recent 
tournament I attended. 
Early in the tournament, I observed a negative team 
which used "spread tactics" to answer the affirmative argu-
ments. Typical of spread tactics, the negative arguments 
in this case were too numerous to be well developed and too 
numerous to all be answered with an equal amount of attention. 
On the ballot, the judge awarded the decision to the negative 
because "although the affirmative were obviously the better 
debaters (8 points better in speaker points), the negative 
raised so many plan attacks that the affirmative did not have 
time to answer them all." 
Later in the tournament, I judged an affirmative team 
which raised two major contentions: "1) that organized crime 
puts the squeeze on America; and 2) that (our team)will put 
the squeeze on Organized Crime." In my opinion, the wording 
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of these contentions was sufficiently vague enough to allow the 
affirmative to shift its interpretation of the contentions 
while answering negative attacks. While I thought this an 
extremely poor tactic on the part of the affirmative, most 
judges evidently did not for my decision was the only loss that 
case received in eight affirmative rounds of debate. 
Finally, I sat in on a round in which two better-than-
average affirmative debaters competed against one good and 
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one very poor negative debater. Although the affirmative 
team earned more speaker points than the negative, the good 
negative debater according to the judge did manage to refute 
the cause-effect relationship on which the affirmative based 
its case and, thus, won the decision. 
Each of these illustrations tends to confirm the trend 
noted by J. Michael Sproule toward judging on the basis of 
issues rather than on skills--a trend which I believe is going 
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in the wrong direction. In my opinion decisions should not 
be awarded on the basis of who talks the fastest or the trick-
iest, nor even on the basis of who legitimately wins one key 
issue. Decisions should instead be awarded on the basis of 
which team of debaters demonstrates the greatest clarity of 
organization, precision in the choice of language, incisive-
ness in analysis of issues, coherence in the drawing of 
conclusions from evidence, and articulateness in presentation • 
. There is little doubt that judging on issues is easier 
than judging on skills, and usually more widely understood 
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and appreciated by debaters. But judging on issues em-
phasizes the end results at the expense of the means or 
methods of achieving such results. Hence judging on issues 
obscures the process of decision-making. If debate, as an 
intercollegiate activity, is substantively ever to be more 
than a verbal trackmeet or a mental football game, then those 
of us who coach and judge debate must refocus our critical 
attention on the processes by which arguments are developed, 
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realizing that to the degree those processes are properly 
adhered to the long-term results will be valid and 
reliable. 
Verna Ruth Abbott 
As a debate judge, I am concerned with judging the 
evidence, the reasoning, and the presentation. The affirmative 
side carries the burden of proof and must convince the judge 
with sufficient support for its argument. The negative side 
must convince the judge with the refutation of the opponent's 
argument. With this as a basis, I listen for logical, clear 
reasoning, presented in a well-organized, persuasive manner. 
I put great emphasis on delivery and how well the debater 
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communicates his thesis and supportive ideas. 
It is my observation that many debaters become so in-
volved with their material and proof, trying to overwhelm 
the judge with a mass of material, they neglect the communication 
of their ideas and mar their presentation with sloppy delivery, 
too rapid a pace, and poor articulation. No matter how in-
depth the research, or how sound the documentation of proof, 
if the judge cannot understand what the debater is saying, the 
debater cannot convince the judge of the validity and sound-
ness of his viewpoint. My final decision as judge is based on 
the fundamental question: which side persuaded me to accept 
their stand on the proposition? 
35 
Jim Brooks 
Given my own fondness for inconsistency - even wild hair-
iness, I am suspicious of all formal decision-making policy 
statements, including and especially mine. The more debates 
that I hear, the fewer a priori positions I defend. As a 
matter of fact, one of the things I enjoy most about current 
academic debating practice is the dynamic nature of decision-
making theory. Nothing that follows then should be considered 
a personal absolute; everything below to the contrary notwith-
standing, I will use any decision-making model (system? 
position? eccentricity?) in a particular round that is per-
suasively forced upon me, or that is presented and defended by 
one team, and unchallenged or agreed to by the other. In the 
final analysis, I believe that debate decision-making theory 
is debatable (as is everything else), and, alas, I will listen 
to anything. For anyone who might still be interested in my 
current thinking on debate decision-making, read on. 
In various debates, I have been persuaded to resolve the 
issues by every known and unknown theoretical system - including, 
in at least one instance, awarding the debate to the team most 
willing to renounce totally the policy position it defended in 
constructives. Still, there are two approaches to decision-
making that I am most comfortable with. The one theory that I 
find less preferable but nonetheless useful might be called the 
traditional stock issues model. This places heavy burdens on 
the affirmative team. Negative debaters may argue practically 
36 
anything short of either inherency/plan attack contradictions 
or evidential contradictions. Presumption and the unknown 
risk in change weigh heavily for the negative. Negative argumenta-
tion may contain direct refutation, numerous inherency chal-
lenges, defenses of the solvency potential of many status quo 
mechanisms, a liberal number of minor repairs, and the full 
range of solvency and disadvantage arguments. To win the 
debate, the negative team need only defeat one of three major 
issues: the need or justification for change, the plan solvency, 
the superiority of plan advantages over potential disadvantages. 
My major objection to the stock issues approach to decision-
making is that this model does not necessarily force the nega-
tive to take a policy position stand -- other than perhaps a stand 
against the resolution in general. I find this approach even 
more objectionable when it is extended by the negative team to 
the position that has become known as hypothesis testing. My 
understanding of the hypothesis testing decision-making model is 
that it is based on the idea that real-world decision-making 
often involves the consideration of multiple alternative 
approaches to solving a problem; that the n~gative team may not 
only argue all the traditional stock issue positions but may 
also introduce in theory at least an unlimited number of policy 
alternatives (counter-plans); and that the only absolute position 
that the negative team needs to take is one that. denies the 
resolution which is the hypothesis being tested. I suppose 
hypothesis testing is theoretically sound ana I am certain. that 
real-world decision-making profits from the consideration of 
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multiple alternatives to solving problems - especially since 
the real world has forever, instead of seventy-two minutes 
excluding prepar·ation ' time. I am equally certain that the time 
constraints of the academic debate format do not permit 
intelligent consideration of . limitless negative argumentation 
including numerous thirty-second counter-plans. However, I do 
believe that academic debate should reflect real-world decision-
making with policy comparisons. But this must be done within the 
time constraints of the debate format if intelligent decisions 
are to be made by admittedly dull judges such as myself. More-
over, the advocates in academic debate should have some consistent 
commitment throughout the debate to the policy alternative they 
defend. And that leads me to the second and more preferable 
decision-making model. 
I prefer that debaters place me in the position of choos-
ing between (not among) competing policy systems dealing with 
a single problem area. The negative policy system may be more 
implicit than explicit; still, I prefer the negative clearly 
outline and defend a specific, coordinated policy system through-
out the debate. Each team may defend one policy system. I will 
vote for the better policy system, or the one that is shown on 
balance to · be more advantageous. Presumption will lie with the 
system that has the greatest known factors; i.e., the present 
system. If the negative team wishes to propose a new policy 
system, they should expect to lose all claim to presumption 
and to accept the same degree of risk accepted by the affirma-
tive. In other words, I do not like conditional counter-plans. 
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My biases toward counter-plan debating are based in tradi-
tional theory. I look for the policy that better solves the 
problem first isolated by the affirmative. If the affirmative 
plan requires enormous resources relative to available re-
sources, this should serve as the basis of several categories 
of disadvantage arguments; this should not serve as grounds 
for a competitiveness position to justify a counter-plan deal-
ing with a new problem area. If solving the problem with the 
affirmative plan would require so much of available resources 
so as to preclude normal governmental consideration for solv-
ing other pressing national problems, the negative should 
contend that the prob1em does not merit the solution; i.e.r 
that the plan is not cost beneficial. My preferred role as a 
decision maker in academic debate then is one of a chooser 
between policy systems, with each team restricted to defending 
one policy system each dealing with the same problem area. 
I would like to add brief comments on two other important 
concepts that often have impact on my decisions. First, I 
believe that topicality is an important issue in current 
academic debate and one that, for obvious theoretical reasons, 
can take precedence over all other issues in any particular 
debate. However, I do not believe in the spirit of the re-
solution, nor do I believe that any affirmative team or 
negative team or any judge or any group of judges has any 
special revelation about the true meaning of any resolution. 
The meaning of any resolution can most often be best sought 
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through the contextual history that deals with the problem area 
that the resolution appears to focus on. Still, in that language 
and thought and problems are all dynamic in nature, there can 
never be an absolute topicality determination and the . issue of 
topicality is always debatable. Secondly, I would like to 
comment on disadvantage argumentation. Unproven, undocumented, 
but extraordinarily reasonable disadvantages may not win a 
ballot by themselves, but they do significantly increase the 
negative presumption when I am judging the debate. On the 
other hand, I am unconvinced by contrived, though heavily 
documented, disadvantages that wander through endless, tenuous 
casual links finally to arrive at a harm. 
Those readers who are still with me at this point in this 
essay have an obvious, though inexplicable, interest in how I 
judge debates. It · will be your burden to resolve finally the 
vicious rumors about my flipping a coin. But before you commit 
yourself to my defense, perhaps you should return to near the 
beginning of this statement and re-read sentence one in 
paragraph two. 
Kenneth Schott 
Debate is the most complex of all the forensic events and 
makes the greatest demands on the judge. Every debate judge 
needs a knowledge of the fundamentals of debating, a knowledge 
of the topic being debated, some personal experience in com-
petitive debate, and a consistent set of criteria for evaluating 
debate. 
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The old A. F. A. Debate Ballot (Form C) lists six criteria 
for debate evaluation: analysis, reasoning, evidence, organiza-
tion, refutation, and delivery. Each category was designed to 
receive equal weight in the judge's decision. Unfortunately, 
such objectivity is impossible even with such a highly structured 
instrument as the "Form C" Debate Ballot. Some judges give a 
disproportionate amount of weight to analysis; others make their 
decision primarily on delivery. The "Form E" Debate Ballot, 
currently used in most major tournaments, provides no criteria 
for evaluating a debate. The judge is free to apply his own 
criteria and priorities in making the decision. Consequently, 
an even greater disparity often exists among debate judges. 
My first priority in arriving at my decision in judging 
a debate is analysis and refutation which I will combine into 
a single term, ISSUES. This is the ingredient that uniquely 
distinguishes debate from all other forensic events. Once the 
negative team outlines the major areas of clash between teams, 
I follow those arguments as they are extended and developed 
during the course of the debate. I believe that if the 
affirmative team drops any significant negative argument, 
they should lose the debate and my decision is relatively 
easy. For example, if the negative team raises serious doubt 
as to the efficacy of the affirmative plan and the affirmative 
team fails to dispel that doubt, my decision goes negative. 
My second priority is EVIDENCE AND REASONING. Assuming 
that the affirmative team presents a prima facie case, the 
negative team must substantiate their major arguments with 
evidence or I will decide for the affirmative. 
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My third consideration is organization and delivery which I 
will combine under the category, SPEECH SKILLS. If both teams 
appear equal in analysis of issues and evidence, I usually vote 
for the team which is better organized and more persuasive 
in presenting their case. A rapid fire delivery with slurred, 
sloppy articulation often becomes unintelligible in a debate 
round. The heavy use of debate lingo and cliches such as 
"PMN's," "DA's~ and "flow" also hampers effective conununication. 
Other subjective factors in a debate often affect my judg-
ment adversely. These factors tend to influence my decision 
although I would not make them the sole rationale for win or 
loss. One factor that turns me against a particular debater 
is the use of profanity in a debate speech. I do not believe 
profanity is appropriate in public address and I will rate that 
speaker low on the ballot. Sarcasm and discourtesy also affect 
me adversely. 
Finally, I would like to propose a standard for debate 
judges which I will call "The Golden Rule of Debate." It is 
to treat other teams as you would like for your team to be 
treated. I believe the application of this simple principle 
by debate judges would result in the best possib~e decisions 
in a tournament. It would cause judges to flow a debate con-
scientiously, to explain the reasons for their decisions carefully, 
and include comments on the ballot which would help each team 
to improve their debating skills. 
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Janet M. Vasilius 
Ideally, my judging philosophy is very simple: I vote for 
the team which persuades me their position is true. How~ver, 
as academic debate is rarely ideal, certain criteria aid in 
decision making. Frequently, the criteria must be decided 
in the individual round; the increasing discussion of argu-
mentation theory by debate participants is an excellent 
demonstration of the dynamism of debate. The team that wishes 
to argue hypothesis testing, counterplans, conditional argu-
ments or value validity should be allowed to argue for their 
strategy. Likewise, the team that chooses tq isolate a single 
issue in the debate should have that discretion. 
Unfortunately, many teams lack either the inclination or 
ability to discuss argumentation theory in competition. 
For these teams the "policy maker" judging criteria has 
several advantages. First, the teams must argue consiste~t­
ly. When two speakers on the same team contradict each 
other, there is no coherent policy presented. When this 
occurs the obvious conclusion is that the teams in con-
tradiction are confused, refuse to listen to each other or 
are misrepresenting their research. This is, of course, not 
to deny that a team may take divergent approaches to an issue, 
merely that these approaches must not be in contradiction. 
Second, the comparison of two policy options clarifies 
issues by placing them in contrast. Thus, the critic can 
evaluate the advanrages of the affirmative proposal by 
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examining the risks suggested by the disadvantages; the pro-
gressivity of the status quo must be measured against the 
speed and universality with which the affirmative ~ay imple-
ment the proposal; the values inherent in the affirmative 
may be considered against the competing values of the 
negative. 
Third, traditional components of argumentation such as 
burden of proof and presumption fit comfortably into the 
model. Rathern than compare two policies on an equally com-
petitive basis, as may occur when a counterplan is advanced, 
the affirmative has the burden of overcoming the risk inherent 
in change. Plan objections become particularily important 
if the rationale for change can be supported by the affirmative. 
Most systems need change, the difficulty is in the implementation 
of that change. The burden of refutation is also clarified by 
policy comparison as each team is forced to view the totality 
of the opposition's position, rather than focusing on a few 
isolated issues. Coverage is very much a part of the burden 
of refutation. 
Fourth, policy decisions allow a comprehensive discussion 
of the issues within the limited time allowed. The prime 
difficulty in hypothesis testing is the confusion that results 
when an inexpert team attempts to explore maximum possibilities 
in a minimal amount of time. ·on the other end of the spect-
rum, teams who limit their discussion to a few issues produce 
argumentative redundancy, rather than argumentative depth. 
The topic, and the affirmative case restrict argumentation; 
there is no need for further curtailment. Policy making is 
the most practicable approach to judging. 
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The counterplan has been prominent in recent years; ~he 
conditional or hypothetical counterplan has also surfaced. 
Counterplans serve to expand the scope of argumentation by 
allowing the negative team to develope the . best arguments, 
rather than merely the traditional arguments, concerning 
the resolution. With a counterplan, . the negative team may 
deviate from defense of the status quo, or may expos~ a 
faulty affirmative proposal by presenting an alternative 
to that solution. A counterplan imposes the burdens of ·non-
topicali ty., competitiveness and an addi tiona! advantage which 
the negative must secure to counteract the shift of pre-
sumption~ The conditional counterplan provides a solution 
to the dilemma faced by the negative speaker who perceives 
a need for change, but cannot suggest a minor change without. 
adopting the resolutional change suggested by the affirmative. 
With the inclusion of parameters with the debate re~ 
solution, topicality can be perplexing for the critic. Some 
cases may be topical but not fit the parameters; a few cases 
may be parametrical without being- topical. As the Develop-
mental Conference which suggested the parameters also specified 
that the parameters not be binding on the team's inter-
pretation of the resolution, it would be inappropriate for an 
individual critic to restrict the competitiors. My view of 
45 
topicality has tended to be fairly liberal in practice, _not 
because I ignore topicality arguments, but because few 
topicality arguments have persuaded me that .the affirmative 
case lie outside the bounds of the resolution. Extratopi-
cality, as a device to reduce solvency or the significance of 
an affirmative case, seems to be a more practicable argument. 
Attitudinal inherency is as legitimate· as structural 
inherency. Actually, as structural inherency is ultimately 
based on attitudes, attitudinal inherency is both cause and 
effect of structural inherency and should be considered at 
least as viable. Teams arguing attitudinal inherency, 
however, may encounter difficulties in claiming solvency. 
The turnaround of a disadvantage to an advantage is an. 
old technique with a recent label. The best defense is still 
a good offense; by turning a disadvanrage to the favor of the 
affirmative team, the defeat of the attack is absolute. 
However, the additive advantage gained by the affirmative 
demands external support before it should be added to the 
benefits of the affirmative case. 
Cross examination plays an important part in decision 
making. All cross examination periods are flowed and re-
ferred to as the debate progresses. A position taken in the 
cross examination period is binding; a question left un-
answered is as damaging as a dropped argument; a question 
that is not raised before rebuttals may not be asked at 
that time. Cross examination effectiveness is a characteris-
tic of a competent team, whether the team is questioning 
or responding. 
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Ethics cannot be overemphasized. The quantity of evidence 
used, the closed nature of most debate rounds and the mobility 
of individual teams provide ample opportunity for abuse. On 
a very basic ethical level is a "fairness doctrine." This 
dictates that new arguments cannot be raised in rebuttal, that 
arguments dropped by one speaker cannot be revived by his 
partner and that the second affirmative rebuttal is an in-
appropriate time to clarify the affirmative case. Refusal 
to allow the opposition to examine evidence or case, refusal 
to clarify or answer questions and use of incomplete source 
citations hinder the ability of the opposition to debate. 
These, and o~her practices, can contribute to the loss of a 
ballot. On questions of varying interpretation of evidence 
each team has the opportunity to convince the critic that their 
view is justified; ultimately the critic may examine the 
evidence herself. The falsification, adulteration or gross 
deletion from context of a piece of documentation is grounds 
for an immediate loss. 
Personal quirks also play a large part in forming a 
judging philosophy. A fast speaking rate is usually indicative 
of argumentative sophistication unfortunately restricted by 
time allotment; however, many teams mistake speed as the cause, 
rather than as the symptom, of excellence. Courtesy to critic, 
partner and opposition is essential. Disadvantages that do 
not apply specifically to a given plan have no place in the 
debate round, no matter how extensively they are developed; 
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arguments unsupported by evidence are totally acceptable if 
the analysis is sound. No argument should be issued that 
cannot suggest an impact. No speaker should repeat an 
argument when she can extend an argument. Adequate pre-
paration, skill in argumentation, inventiveness and considera-
tion should make debate a satisfying experience for all 
involved. 
Kass Kovalcheck 
In recent years the issue of the philosophy of judging 
intercollegiate debates has gained increasing importance 
among those interested in both the practice and theory of 
debate. This concern is an extension of the controversy in 
the late 1950's and early 1960's between those people who 
called themselves "issue judges" and those people who voted 
on "who did the better debating." The question, then, in 
judging was that a debate topic might be so one sided that a 
team could not win the issues of the debate but could be so 
superior in the techniques of debate that even while losing 
the issues, they should be awarded a victory. For years the 
American Forensics Association Debate Ballots asked judges 
to award the decision "to the team that did the better debat-
ing." In the past few years this concept has been extended 
to include such argumentative devices as conditional counter-
plans, additive advantages, "turnarounds," and propositional 
arguments. All these are part of the same package, and a 
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judge's statement of philosophy usually indicates what the 
judge will emphasize in the decision rather than a statement 
that departs from normal argumentation theory. 
Most of us who judge debates accept these precepts: 
(1) the affirmative must advocate a change from the present 
system; (2) that change must be supported by "good reasons," 
either advantages over the present system or some need in-
herent in the present system; (3) the change has to solve 
the problem; and (4) there cannot be overriding disadvantages 
to making that change. While most judges tend to accept 
these standards, individual differences do exist. For · 
example, some judges, when faced with an affirmative case 
with a real problem but a strong indication that the plan 
will not solve the problem will still vote for the affirmative 
unless ~he negative can provide a disadvantage. Others (and 
I believe myself to be part of the others) will not vote for 
the affirmative, even if no disadvantages exist, unless there 
is clear indication that the plan will solve the problem. 
Another instance of judging variation is present in the 
question of counter plans. Some judges believe that a counter-
plan must solve the same problem the affirmative outlines. 
Others, in a period when affirmative cases are so narrowly 
drawn, argue that as long as the counterplan is non-
propositional and that the negative can demonstrate the 
proposals are mutually exclusive, then the plans are compared 
on relative benefit, even if the negative solves a different 
problem. 
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All differences, however, only reflect a commonality of 
opinion on argumentation theory. Judges vote on the issues and 
the resolution of those issues is determined by the team that 
"did the better debating." For those of us judging a significant 
number of debates each year, we inevitably find ourselves 
emphasizing different parts of debate theory in every round, 
but decisions are made as I make them--based on the need for . 
a change, the workability of that change and the disadvantages 
that change creates. For all the differences of judging 
philosophy that individuals might espouse, those have been 
the standards of judgment since Richard Whately became re-
incarnated in the ideal first affirmative speech. 
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